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THE “DUTY OF SAMENESS” AS A SHIELD—GENERIC DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS’ TORT LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR 
LABEL INDEPENDENCE AFTER PLIVA, INC. V. MENSING1 
Danielle L. Steele* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, healthcare expenditure in the United States reached 
$2.5 trillion and accounted for 17.6% of the gross domestic product, 
with prescription-drug spending embodying approximately 10% of 
that amount.2  In 2010, prescription-drug spending continued to 
grow, ultimately reaching $307.4 billion.3  The President’s Fiscal 
Budget for 2012 allocated a greater percentage of the national 
economy to healthcare than to any other category, including national 
defense and social security.4  Given the substantial deficit in which 
America remains, the significance of managing healthcare outlay is 
irrefutable.5 
While the increase in prescription-drug spending from 2009 to 
2010 reveals undeniably significant monetary figures, the growth rate 
 
 1  131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
*   J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law.  The author 
would like to express sincere gratitude to her family and friends—her mother above 
all—for their unfailing support and patience.  Without each and every one of you I 
would not be where I am today. 
 2  NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/highlights.pdf (last 
updated June 14, 2011, 6:37 AM) (stating that in 2009 prescription-drug spending 
was $249 billion, approximately 10% of the $2.5 trillion spent that year). 
 3  IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED 
STATES: REVIEW OF 2010, at 15 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ims/Global/Content/Insights/IMS 
%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHII_UseOfMed_report1_.pdf. 
 4  The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/winning-the-future/interactive-budget (last visited Dec. 
9, 2011) (Healthcare Percentage of Budget: 22.62%; National Defense Percentage of 
Budget: 19.27%; Social Security Percentage of Budget: 20.04%). 
 5  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,  AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (Apr. 2011),  available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12130/04-15-AnalysisPresidentsBudget.pdf 
(showing that the national deficit was $1.294 trillion in 2010). 
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was 45% less than the preceding year.6  An abundance of plausible 
explanations for the decline exist, but an increase of greater than 
26% in the generic drug sector undoubtedly played a substantial role 
in the spending reduction.7  Specific to cost savings and accessibility 
in pharmaceuticals, the merits of generic prescription drugs are 
virtually uncontested.8  The cost of a brand-name drug is on average 
76% greater than that of its generic equivalent; government 
healthcare programs, private insurers, and citizens alike recognize 
this savings directly.9  In a 2010 report expounding the advantages of 
generic drug use for Medicare prescription plan costs, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that over 90% of 
prescriptions written in 2007 were filled with generic drugs, where 
both the generic and brand-name drug were available.10  The CBO 
estimated the resultant savings of such substitution in just one year to 
 
 6  IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 3, at 4 (5.1% in 2009 
compared to 2.3% in 2010).  See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 
112th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2011) (“Federal dollars currently account for an estimated 
30[%] of the $235,000,000,000 spent on prescription drugs in 2008, and this share is 
expected to rise to 40[%] by 2018.”). 
 7  IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 3, at 6 (combining the 
growth of generics and authorized generics); see infra note 31 and accompanying text 
(describing authorized generics). 
 8  Press Release, Generic Pharmaceutical Ass’n, Health Care Reform: One Year 
Later—GPhA Presses Need to Generate Savings in Health Care Reform Efforts (Mar. 
23, 2011), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2011 
/health-care-reform-one-year-later-gpha-presses-need-generate-savings-healt.  In a 
press release citing data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association announced that “the Medicaid generic 
dispensing rate now stands at 69% nationwide.  Just a [one] percentage point 
increase in this rate would save states and the Federal Government $682 million.”  Id.  
This figure takes all prescriptions filled into account even where there were not 
generic options available.  Id. 
 9  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 
5 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf 
[hereinafter EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS].  
 10  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE’S 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 7 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11838/09-15-PrescriptionDrugs.pdf 
[hereinafter EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS].  For purposes of this Comment, a 
“generic” drug refers to a pharmaceutical product equivalent of the brand-name 
drug marketed subsequent to the innovating company’s patent expiration or 
adjudicated invalidity; “brand-name” drugs will interchangeably be referred to as 
“list” drugs to maintain consistency with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
vocabulary on the topic.  See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, 
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at x (32nd 
ed. 2012) [hereinafter THE ORANGE BOOK] available at http://www.fda.gov 
/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf. 
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be greater than $33 billion.11 
Decades of legislative efforts have shaped a framework favoring 
entrance of generic competition to brand-name pharmaceutical 
products the moment patent protection expires.12  The vast and 
flourishing industry of generic drug manufacturers places vital 
significance on the implications of a recent United States Supreme 
Court decision.13  On June 23, 2011, in a five-to-four decision, the 
Court rendered an unanticipated interpretation of the preemption-
by-impossibility doctrine, holding that manufacturers of generic 
prescription drugs are immune to liability for state tort failure-to-
warn claims.14  The subsequent denial of a rehearing renders the 
necessity of agency regulation or legislative intervention inevitable.15 
In granting certiorari for this decision, the Court consolidated 
the actions of patients Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy.16  Pursuant 
to their physicians’ care, Mensing and Demahy were each recipients 
of prescriptions for the brand-name drug Reglan to treat 
gastrointestinal symptoms;17 both received the corresponding generic 
 
 11  EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10 (noting that industry 
observers proffer a similar rate of generic use where both generic and brand-name 
drugs are available in the private sector); see also Doug Long, VP Industry Relations, 
IMS, Presented to NCPO: The US Pharmaceutical Market: Trends, Issues, & Outlook, slide 
27 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://ncpo.hdma.net/pdfs/long.pdf (disregarding the 
availability of a generic alternative, 73.6% of all prescriptions were filled with 
generics as of September 2010). 
 12  See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments], for the hearings on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act.  See generally, The Assoc. Press, A Historical Look at Healthcare 
Legislation, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/nation 
/washington/articles/2010/03/21/a_historical_look_at_health_care_legislation 
(providing a timeline of centuries of healthcare legislation). 
 13  EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS., supra note 10, at 18 (“Drugs accounting for 
another $43 billion in U.S. retail sales, representing a further 21[%] of the U.S. retail 
market in 2007, will be subject to first time generic entry during 2010 through 
2012.”). 
 14  PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 15  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, reh’g denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3078 (2011). 
 16  Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
817 (2010), reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011), and rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 55 (2011); 
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 17  See generally, Gastroparesis, AMERICAN DIABETES ASS’N, 
http://www.diabetes.org/living-with-diabetes/complications/gastroparesis.html (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2012) (discussing gastroparesis as a condition causing delayed 
expulsion of food from the stomach resulting in symptoms including bloating, acid 
reflux and discomfort amongst others—this was Mensing’s diagnosis); 
Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease, PUBMED HEALTH, 
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drug, metoclopramide, from their pharmacists.18  Both patients 
developed tardive dyskinesia (TD)19—a progressive and debilitating 
neurological disorder—after their treatments exceeded the 
recommended length of therapy.20  Mensing and Demahy brought 
actions in their respective state courts against the individual generic 
manufacturers of the metoclopramide they had received.21  Each 
plaintiff alleged that long-term use of metoclopramide had caused 
her condition and claimed that the manufacturers were liable for, 
inter alia, failure-to-warn in accordance with state product liability laws 
in Minnesota and Louisiana.22  Amidst a growing circuit split on the 
issue,23 the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
found in favor of the co-existence of state tort law with the federal 
prescription drug regulation and held that federal parameters did 
not preempt the failure-to-warn claims.24  This Comment will develop 
the preceding history and judicial interpretation involved in both 
cases more extensively below. 
The holding in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing came just two years after 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal regulations do not preempt 
brand-name prescription drug manufacturers’ state tort liability for 
failure-to-warn claims.25  In Wyeth v. Levine, the plaintiff, Diane Levine, 
suffered irreversible gangrene, and ultimately amputation of her arm, 
because of the method of administration used to deliver the anti-
nausea drug Phenergan.26  A Vermont jury found Wyeth, the drug 
manufacturer, guilty of failure-to-warn of the risks associated with the 
 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001311/ (last visited Apr. 26, 
2012) (describing gastroesophageal reflux as a condition in which the contents of 
the stomach recede to the esophagus causing heartburn and general discomfort—
this was Demahy’s diagnosis).   
 18  Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605.  
 19  Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605. 
 20  TD is an incurable condition caused almost exclusively by long-term treatment 
with certain medications.  Patients diagnosed with TD experience sudden, 
uncontrollable movements of voluntary muscle groups in the face, limbs, and digits.  
Tardive Dyskinesia, TD CENTER, http://www.tardivedyskinesia.com/symptoms/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2012). 
 21  Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605. 
 22  Demahy, 593 F.3d at 430; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605. 
 23  See, e.g., Demahy, 593 F.3d at 431 n.7 (providing examples of circuit court 
decisions on the question of federal preemption of state tort law for generic 
pharmaceuticals).  
 24  Mensing, 588 F.3d at 614; Demahy, 593 F.3d at 449. 
 25  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).  
 26  Id. 
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method of administration used and awarded damages.27  The 
Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the outcome.28  Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court’s decision led to consensus among circuits that 
federal regulation of prescription drugs did not preempt state tort 
liability for failure-to-warn in the case of the brand-name drug 
manufacturer.29  Less clarity emerged with regard to Wyeth’s 
application to generic pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and a split 
ensued amongst circuits.30 
The precedent that the Supreme Court established in Mensing 
results in inequitable and arbitrary consequences for patients, distorts 
the doctrine of preemption, tips the balance of oversight between 
state and federal powers, misinterprets congressional intent, and 
impedes self-regulation; the holding compels legislative or regulatory 
action.  To provide context, Part II of this Comment will discuss the 
federal regulations applicable to brand-name and generic 
manufacturers as well as the legislative intent underlying their 
promulgation.  Part II will also discuss the resulting proliferation of 
generic prescription use and forecasts of future growth.  Part III will 
introduce substitution laws throughout the United States that govern 
the practice of pharmacists filling prescriptions for brand-name drugs 
with generic counterparts.  This part will also focus on other factors 
influencing increased use of generics, such as formulary coverage by 
private insurers, Medicare and Medicaid restrictions, and the 
withdrawal of brand-name drugs from the market.  Additionally, Part 
III will address proposed and enacted healthcare reform and finally, 
the controversial sector of authorized generics.31  Part IV will consider 
the complementary objectives of state tort law and federal regulation 
in the pharmaceutical industry.  This part will also analyze the 
traditional application of implied preemption-by-impossibility, as well 
as the case law establishing that brand-name drug manufacturers are 
 
 27  Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006). 
 28  Id. 
 29  See, e.g., Wimbush v. Wyeth, 619 F.3d 632, 645 (6th Cir. 2010); Hughes v. 
Boston Sci. Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2011); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharms., 606 
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2010); Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 393 
(7th Cir. 2010); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 586 F.3d 547, 563 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 30  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 31  Authorized Generics, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, 
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/authorized-generics (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) 
(“An authorized generic is the brand company’s own product repackaged and 
marketed as a generic either through a subsidiary or third party.  Brand companies 
generally raise the brand drug’s price when the authorized generic is introduced—
resulting in an even greater expense to consumers.”). 
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not liable for tortious conduct of generic manufacturers.  Part V will 
discuss Mensing in light of the preceding sections and develop the 
dissent authored by Justice Sotomayor.  Part V will also assess several 
of the amicus briefs submitted to the court in Mensing as well as cases 
decided in Mensing’s wake.  Part VI will propose a solution through 
either legislative action or agency regulation that places 
manufacturers of generic drugs in a position parallel to that of brand-
name drug manufacturers with respect to label responsibility.  Lastly, 
Part VII will conclude. 
II. TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS, AND TRIUMPHS—PROGRESSION IN THE 
FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 
A. The Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act 
The United States has a centuries-old history of making public 
health and welfare a centralized undertaking, with reformations 
traditionally gaining momentum in times of exigency.32  In 1906, the 
Food and Drug Act gave rise to the modern Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and allocated responsibility to that office for 
consumer protection in relation to food and drugs used in interstate 
commerce.33  The limited regulatory abilities of the FDA prompted 
passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 
1938—for the first time the federal agency maintained significant 
oversight of public health.34  The legislation vested power in the FDA 
to control the approval and marketing of all drugs, shape the quality 
standards for food, and inspect factories involved in food 
production.35 
At present, the FDA provides the most comprehensive 
framework governing public health and welfare as affected by food 
 
 32  Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (an example of legislation in response to public outcry is 
the Sherley Amendment of 1912.  The amendment was the first to “prohibit[] 
labeling medicines with false therapeutic claims intended to defraud the purchaser.”  
The Sherley Amendment followed many infant deaths attributed to “Mrs. Winslow’s 
Soothing Syrup for teething and colicky babies, unlabeled yet laced with morphine”). 
 33  History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA 
/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012). 
 34  Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory 
Information/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012). 
 35  Id. 
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and drug products in the developed world.36  The current state of 
reform under the Obama Administration is responsive in part to the 
inequitable limitations and selective coverage practices that privatized 
health insurance companies use; healthcare affordability for every 
patient remains a driving factor.37 
B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act; the legislation is widely known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA.38  The Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments comprised two titles: “The purpose of Title I of the bill 
[wa]s to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a 
generic drug approval procedure,”39 while “[t]he purpose of Title II 
of the bill [wa]s to create a new incentive for increased expenditures 
for research and development . . . [through] the restoration of some 
 
 36  See Regulations and Policies and Procedures for Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/ucm090394.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). 
The mission of FDA is to enforce laws enacted by the U.S. Congress 
and regulations established by the Agency to protect the consumer’s 
health, safety, and pocketbook.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act is the basic food and drug law of the U.S.  With numerous 
amendments, it is the most extensive law of its kind in the world.  The 
law is intended to assure consumers that foods are pure and 
wholesome, safe to eat, and produced under sanitary conditions; that 
drugs and devices are safe and effective for their intended uses; that 
cosmetics are safe and made from appropriate ingredients; and that all 
labeling and packaging is truthful, informative, and not deceptive.   
Id.   
Today, the FDA regulates $1 trillion worth of products a year.  It 
ensures the safety of all food except for meat, poultry and some egg 
products; ensures the safety and effectiveness of all drugs, biological 
products (including blood, vaccines and tissues for transplantation), 
medical devices, and animal drugs and feed; and makes sure that 
cosmetics and medical and consumer products that emit radiation do 
no harm. 
Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation 
/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).  
 37  See The Affordable Care Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRES. BARACK OBAMA, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview#healthcare-menu 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (“The Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress and signed 
into law by the President in March 2010, gives [patients] better health security by 
putting in place comprehensive health insurance reforms that hold insurance 
companies accountable, lower health care costs, guarantee more choice, and 
enhance the quality of care for all Americans.”) 
 38  H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984). 
 39  Id. at 14. 
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of the time lost on patent life while [a pharmaceutical] product is 
awaiting pre-market approval.”40  The public policy purpose of Title II 
sought to balance the effects of Title I with various incentives for 
innovation; Title II has little relevance for purposes of this Comment 
but does bear on market factors affecting brand-name 
pharmaceutical pricing models.  The substance of Title I will 
constitute the discussion of this section for background purposes. 
The expiration of patent protection on pharmaceutical products 
provides an opportunity for competition from generic drug 
manufacturers to drive market factors toward reduced drug costs for 
the public.  To further the purpose of the FDA, and of Title I of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, legislators sought to reduce economic 
barriers to entry for generic pharmaceutical companies: 
 The manufacturer of a pioneer drug must conduct tests 
on humans that show the product to be safe and effective 
and submit the results in a New Drug Application (NDA).  
A manufacturer of a generic drug must conduct tests that 
show the generic drug is the same as the pioneer drug and 
that it will be properly manufactured and labeled.  This 
information is submitted in an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA). 
 The only difference between a NDA and an ANDA is that 
the generic manufacturer is not required to conduct 
human clinical trials.  FDA considers such retesting to be 
unnecessary and wasteful because the drug has already been 
determined to be safe and effective.  Moreover, such 
retesting is unethical because it requires that some sick 
patients take placebos and be denied treatment known to 
be effective.41 
In 1984, the ANDA procedure was available only to generic 
manufacturers for drugs brought to market prior to 1962; the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments extended the practice to brand-name drugs 
developed post-1962.42  The stated purpose was increased availability 
of low-cost generic drugs, and the legislative history reveals a 
presumption of safety already existing in such products. 
C. Bringing a Novel Drug to the Public: Rigors of the NDA 
Estimates cited by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services in 2010 placed the cost of discovering and bringing a novel 
 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. at 16. 
 42  Id.  
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branded drug to market at over a billion dollars.43  The exorbitant 
cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical field is unyielding, which 
logically makes patent protection crucial to motivate innovation.44  
Brand-name drug pricing has consistently indicated this as 
manufacturers incorporate the costs of bringing new products to 
market in their products’ prices during exclusivity. 
Chapter 9 of Title 21 in the United States Code lays out the 
applicable federal regulations for drugs distributed in interstate 
commerce as overseen by the FDA.45  The application for approval to 
market a novel drug is extensive, requiring: 
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to 
show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether 
such drug is effective in use; (B) a full list of the articles 
used as components of such drug; (C) a full statement of 
the composition of such drug; (D) a full description of the 
methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, 
the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug; (E) 
such samples of such drug and of the articles used as 
components thereof as the Secretary may require; (F) 
specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such 
drug, and (G) any assessments required under section 355c 
of this title.46 
The NDA investigation requirement mandates the applicant’s 
provision of “[a] description and analysis of each controlled clinical 
study pertinent to a proposed use of the drug, including the protocol 
and a description of the statistical analyses used to evaluate the 
study.”47  The applicant must further provide exhaustive detail of all 
experiences and observations in any aspect of drug development and 
ownership.48 
 
 43  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 4 (citation omitted).  
 44  Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 2 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/grabow-patents.pdf  (“The importance of patents 
to pharmaceutical innovation has been reported in several cross-industry studies by 
economists.”). 
 45  21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2006). 
 46  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). 
 47  21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(ii). 
 48  This requires: 
A description and analysis of any other data or information relevant to 
an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug product 
obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source, 
foreign or domestic, including information derived from clinical 
investigations, including controlled and uncontrolled studies of uses of 
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Less than a single percent of compounds examined in pre-
clinical trials ever make it to human examination and “[o]nly [20%] 
of the compounds entering clinical trials survive the development 
process and gain FDA approval.”49  The FDA requires extensive 
clinical trials that adhere to rigorous standards; according to the 
CBO, completion of the necessary studies followed by approval of a 
NDA takes over eight years on average.50 
The FDA review of clinical studies occurs in conjunction with 
evaluation of the proposed labeling, which must also fulfill 
comprehensive requirements.51  NDA labeling specimen 
requirements break down to several components, which must be 
adhered to rigorously.52 
 
the drug other than those proposed in the application, commercial 
marketing experience, reports in the scientific literature, and 
unpublished scientific papers.  
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv). 
 49  Grabowski, supra note 44, at 4. 
 50  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 17 (July 1998), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf [hereinafter INCREASED 
COMPETITION FROM GENERICS]. 
 51  21 C.F.R. § 201.57. 
 52  The requirements break down as follows: 
 
Description: Proprietary and established name of drug; dosage form; 
ingredients; chemical name; and structural formula. 
 
Clinical Pharmacology: Summary of the actions of the drug in humans; 
in vitro and in vivo actions in animals if pertinent to human 
therapeutics; pharmacokinetics. 
 
Indications and Usage: Description of use of drug in the treatment, 
prevention, or diagnosis of a recognized disease or condition. 
 
Contraindications: Description of situations in which the drug should 
not be used because the risk of use clearly outweighs any possible 
benefit. 
 
Warnings: Description of serious adverse reactions and potential safety 
hazards, subsequent limitation in use, and steps that should be taken if 
they occur. 
 
Precautions: Information regarding any special care to be exercised for 
the safe and effective use of the drug. Includes general precautions and 
information for patients on drug interactions, 
carcinogenesis/mutagenesis, pregnancy rating, labor and delivery, 
nursing mothers, and pediatric use. 
 
Adverse Reactions: Description of undesirable effect(s) reasonably 
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The label, once approved, forms the basis upon which physicians 
rely in making their prescribing decisions for individual patients.53  
The label also provides patients with information they need to be 
fully informed about the drugs they are consuming and the 
likelihood of experiencing risks and benefits associated with such 
consumption.  Based upon its crucial role in placing consumers on 
notice, the label constitutes a source of tort liability, thus providing 
another powerful incentive for manufacturers to provide 
comprehensive disclosure.  Essentially, patients and physicians are 
the end consumers of a manufacturer’s pharmaceutical product, so 
the manufacturer is naturally inclined to balance a desire to stay 
profitable with legal requirements of disclosure imposed by federal 
regulation and risk of tort liability. 
D. Imitation is Inexpensive and Encouraged: The Ease of the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Based on the success of the Congressional actions discussed 
supra, the average cost of bringing a generic drug to market is under 
$2 million, less than a quarter of the average costs associated with 
novel drugs.54  “In essence, imitation costs in pharmaceuticals are 
extremely low relative to the innovator’s costs for discovering and 
developing a new compound.”55  A manufacturer filing an ANDA 
 
associated with the proper use of the drug. 
 
Drug Abuse/ Dependence: Description of types of abuse that can 
occur with the drug and the adverse reactions pertinent to them. 
 
Overdosage: Description of the signs, symptoms and laboratory 
findings of acute overdosage and the general principles of treatment. 
 
Dosage/ Administration: Recommendation for usage dose, usual 
dosage range, and, if appropriate, upper limit beyond which safety and 
effectiveness have not been established. 
 
How Supplied: Information on the available dosage forms to which the 
labeling applies. 
Shashank Upadhye, Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) Approval Process, Labeling 
Review, in GENERIC PHARM. PATENT & FDA LAW, § 7:9 tbl.7-3 (Feb. 2012), available at 
Westlaw GENPHARMA § 7:9. 
 53  Training and Continuing Education, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (last visited Dec. 
11, 2012) (stating that the “primary purpose [of drug labeling] is to give healthcare 
professionals the information they need to prescribe drugs appropriately”). 
 54  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 4–5 (citation omitted). 
 55  Grabowski, supra note 44, at 4. 
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must include information showing that the generic drug for which it 
seeks approval has the same active ingredients as the “listed drug” for 
which it claims equivalence.56  The term “listed drug” refers to the 
drug “identified by the FDA as the drug product upon which an 
applicant relies in seeking approval of its ANDA.”57  Inactive 
ingredients are not required to be the same as the list drug upon 
which the ANDA relies.58  The application must “identify and 
characterize the inactive ingredients in the proposed drug product 
and provide information demonstrating that such inactive 
ingredients do not affect the safety or efficacy of the proposed drug 
product.”59  The ANDA must further provide “[i]nformation to show 
that the route of administration, dosage form, and strength of the 
drug product are the same as those of the reference listed drug.”60 
In lieu of clinical trials proving safety and efficacy for the drug’s 
intended use, the ANDA must furnish data establishing the 
bioequivalence of the generic drug to the list drug;61 this standard is 
the driving force of generic manufacturers’ cost savings in the process 
of bringing a drug to market.62  The FDA does not require active 
ingredients to be identical for approval: “any formulations that have 
minor differences in composition or method of manufacture from 
the formulation submitted for approval, but are similar enough to be 
relevant to the agency’s determination of bioequivalence [are 
 
 56  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 57  THE ORANGE BOOK, supra note 10, at x. 
 58  21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(8) (“Inactive ingredient means any component other 
than an active ingredient.”).  See generally 21 C.F.R. § 210.3(b)(7) (“Active ingredient 
means any component that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other 
direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or 
to affect the structure of any function of the body of man or other animals.”). 
 59  21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(9)(ii). 
 60  21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(6)(i).  See generally discussion supra Part II.C. 
 61  21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7)(ii); see also 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e). 
Bioequivalence means the absence of a significant difference in the 
rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in 
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes 
available at the site of drug action when administered at the same 
molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed 
study.  
Id. 
 62  Facts and Myths about Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicine 
Safely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) 
(“Generic manufacturers . . . generally do not pay for costly advertising, marketing, 
and promotion.”).   
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allowable].”63  In all applications, the generic manufacturer must 
certify that the drug will not violate the patent of the listed drug.64  
The imitative nature of this process drastically increases the 
likelihood that a generic manufacturer’s product will make it to 
market.  
Most relevant to this Comment, the ANDA must include “[a] 
side-by-side comparison of the applicant’s proposed labeling . . . with 
the approved labeling for the reference listed drug.”65  Simply stated, 
“[l]abeling . . . proposed for the drug product must be the same as 
the labeling approved for the reference listed drug.”66 
The regulations, however, do not require absolute identity 
with the branded label.  . . .  [D]ifferences may include 
“differences in expiration date, formulation, bioavailability, 
or pharmacokinetics, labeling revisions made to comply 
with current FDA labeling guidelines or other guidance, or 
omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling 
protected by patent or accorded exclusivity.”67 
The requirement of label mimicry is logical at the application stage 
because the generic applicant relies entirely on the safety and efficacy 
established vicariously by the list drug’s trials in support of the 
original NDA.  ANDA contenders have not conducted independent 
trials and have no data adhering to FDA standards of reliability. 
In the event that a generic manufacturer wishes to submit an 
ANDA where the list drug is no longer marketed by the brand-name 
manufacturer, the application “must contain all evidence available to 
the petitioner concerning the reasons for the withdrawal from sale.”68  
Upon a determination that the marketing of the drug was not 
discontinued for reasons associated with safety or efficacy, the ANDA 
will be approved relying on the NDA of the discontinued drug69: 
The “Discontinued Drug Product List” identifies, among 
other items, drug products that have been discontinued 
from marketing for reasons other than safety or 
 
 63  21 C.F.R. § 320.1(g); see also Bioequivalence, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, 
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/bioequivalence (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) 
(“Based on FDA analysis of hundreds of bioequivalence studies, FDA has determined 
that small differences in blood levels—less than 4%—may exist in some cases 
between a brand and its generic equivalent.”). 
 64  21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12). 
 65  21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv). 
 66  Id. 
 67  Upadhye, supra note 52, at § 7:9 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv)). 
 68  21 C.F.R. § 314.122(a). 
 69  21 C.F.R. § 314.122(c). 
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effectiveness.  Approved ANDAs that refer to the NDAs 
listed in this document are unaffected by the discontinued 
marketing of the products subject to those NDAs.  
Additional ANDAs that refer to these products may also be 
approved by the agency if they comply with relevant legal 
and regulatory requirements.70 
Brand-name manufacturers frequently withdraw products that are 
subject to generic competition because they are no longer profitable 
to maintain on the market.  Once the product is removed from 
public access, the manufacturer has no obligation to monitor its 
safety, and safety will remain virtually unchanged as it pertains to that 
product because the drug is no longer being produced or consumed.  
“A third of generic drugs no longer have name-brand competitors at 
all,” leaving consumers without brand-name options.71  As discussed 
below, this also leaves the FDA as the only party capable of 
unilaterally changing the label.  Presently, no regulations exist that 
alter the reporting requirements or label-updating abilities discussed 
below of ANDA-approved drugs that rely on withdrawn list drugs. 
E. Post-Approval Safety Compliance and Mechanisms of Independent 
Label Modification 
Safety, in terms of novel drugs, is a dynamic concept.  The safety 
studies conducted for NDA approval exist in a vacuum; by definition, 
long-term safety cannot exist if a drug has not been present over an 
extended period of time.  Furthermore, the market changes 
perpetually—drug interactions will continue to arise as novel 
compounds are invented and introduced to the public.  In order to 
maintain current data, manufacturers of approved drugs, whether by 
NDA or ANDA,72 must comply with monitoring and reporting 
requirements regarding the safety of the drug they market: 
The manufacturer of a drug “shall promptly review all 
 
 70  Determination that MOTRIN (Ibuprofen) Tablets and Four Other Drug 
Products Were Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 
Fed. Reg. 48352, 48353 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-08-10/pdf/2010-19638.pdf. 
 71  Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 
(2011) (No. 09-993), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments 
/argument_transcripts/09-993.pdf. 
 72  21 C.F.R. § 314.98(a) (“[E]ach applicant having an approved abbreviated new 
drug application under § 314.94 that is effective shall comply with the requirements 
of § 314.80 regarding the reporting and recordkeeping of adverse drug 
experiences.”). 
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adverse drug experience73 information obtained or 
otherwise received by the applicant from any source, 
foreign or domestic, including information derived from 
commercial marketing experience, postmarketing clinical 
investigations, postmarketing epidemiological/surveillance 
studies, reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished 
scientific papers.”74 
The manufacturer must also “develop written procedures for the 
surveillance, receipt, evaluation, and reporting of postmarketing 
adverse drug experiences to the FDA.”75 
Regulations mandate that “[t]he applicant . . . report to the FDA 
adverse drug experience information.”76  An applicant’s failure to 
conform to the recording and reporting requirements provides the 
FDA grounds to “withdraw approval of the application and, thus, 
prohibit continued marketing of the drug product that is the subject 
of the application.”77  Both generic and brand-name drugs are subject 
to virtually identical post-market requirements; this is delineated in 
the regulations by referring generic drug manufacturers to the 
regulations pertaining to drugs approved by NDA.78  Adverse event 
reporting is a critical component to the FDA’s understanding of long-
term safety.  Although there are mechanisms for patients and 
physicians to make such reports directly to the FDA, manufacturers 
provide the vast majority of the submissions—over 96% in 2010.79 
One of the procedures available to a drug manufacturer to effect 
label changes that it considers necessary based upon post-approval 
 
 73  Adverse drug experience is defined as: 
Any adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether 
or not considered drug related, including the following: An adverse 
event occurring in the course of the use of a drug product in 
professional practice; an adverse event occurring from drug overdose 
whether accidental or intentional; an adverse event occurring from 
drug abuse; an adverse event occurring from drug withdrawal; and any 
failure of expected pharmacological action.   
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a). 
 74  21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (equivalent 
standard promulgated for reporting in NDA). 
 75  21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b). 
 76  21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c). 
 77  21 C.F.R. § 314.80(j). 
 78  21 C.F.R. § 314.98. 
 79  In 2010, the FDA received 758,890 adverse event reports.  Only 28,952 came 
from reporting parties other than the manufacturer.  Reports Received and Reports 
Entered into AERS by Year, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm070434.htm (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2012). 
STEELE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  4:04 PM 
456 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:441 
 
discoveries is the submission to the FDA of a supplement to the 
manufacturer’s approved application.80  The regulation most 
pertinent to this Comment applies to “moderate changes.”81  Where 
the manufacturer of an already approved drug finds it necessary to 
“add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or 
adverse reaction,” the manufacturer may do so without prior FDA 
approval so long as the agency receives notice “30 days prior to 
distribution of the drug.”82  The manufacturer may make changes to 
add or strengthen a statement about drug abuse, 
dependence, psychological effect, or overdosage; . . . add or 
strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration 
that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product; . . . delete false, misleading, or unsupported 
indications for use or claims for effectiveness; 
or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the FDA.83  “The 
supplement must be labeled ‘Supplement—Changes Being 
Effected.’”84 
The Changes Being Effected (CBE) method is not available to 
manufacturers of generic drugs approved pursuant to an ANDA.85  
Although the regulation does not explicitly state so, the “supplements 
are subject to the substantive standards governing applications, so the 
CBE regulation must be read in conjunction with regulations 
pertaining specifically to generic labeling.”86  As illustrated supra, 
“[t]hose regulations require a generic drug’s labeling to be the same 
 
 80  21 C.F.R. § 314.70. 
 81  21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c). 
 82  21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A). 
 83  21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(B)–(E).  But see Supplemental Applications 
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 
Fed. Reg. 2848-01 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
Allowing sponsors to unilaterally amend the labeling for approved 
products without limitation—even if done to add new warnings—
would undermine the FDA approval process required by Congress.  
Indeed, permitting a sponsor to unilaterally rewrite the labeling for a 
product following FDA’s approval of a product and its labeling would 
disrupt FDA’s careful balancing of how the risks and benefits of the 
product should be communicated. . . . The CBE supplement 
procedures are narrow exceptions to this general rule. 
Id. 
 84  21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(3). 
 85  PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 (2011). 
 86  Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993), 2010 WL 4339894, at 
*13. 
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as the labeling of the reference listed drug.”87 
The FDA may withdraw approval of a generic drug approved 
pursuant to an ANDA at any time if it is determined that the generic 
drug’s labeling “is no longer consistent with that for the listed drug 
referred to in the abbreviated new drug application.”88  As such, post-
approval changes made unilaterally by generic manufacturers are 
sufficient grounds for revocation of the FDA’s authorization to 
market their drug.  This conclusion is supported by the FDA’s 
response to commentary reproduced in the preamble of the final 
adoption of the ANDA regulations: 
 Two comments said the labeling provisions should be 
revised to permit ANDA applicants to deviate from the 
labeling for the reference listed drug to add 
contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, 
and other safety-related information.  One comment added 
that ANDA applicants should be allowed to delete some of 
the indications contained in the labeling for the reference 
listed drug. 
 FDA disagrees with the comments. . . .  ANDA product’s 
labeling must be the same as the listed drug product’s 
labeling because the listed drug product is the basis for 
ANDA approval.  Consistent labeling will assure physicians, 
health professionals, and consumers that a generic drug is 
as safe and effective as its brand-name counterpart.  If an 
ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be 
added to a product’s labeling, it should contact FDA, and 
FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic 
and listed drugs should be revised.  After approval of an 
ANDA, if an ANDA holder believes that new safety 
information should be added, it should provide adequate 
supporting information to FDA, and FDA will determine 
whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should 
be revised.89 
It is a well “established proposition that an agency’s construction of 
 
 87  Id. 
 88  21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). 
 89  Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950-01, 17961 
(Apr. 28, 1992) (internal citations omitted); see also Supplemental Application 
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 
Fed. Reg. 2848-01, n.1 (Jan. 16, 2008) (“CBE changes are not available for generic 
drugs approved under an abbreviated new drug application under 21 U.S.C. 355(j).  
To the contrary, a generic drug manufacturer is required to conform to the 
approved labeling for the listed drug.”). 
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its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.”90  A reading 
of the FDA’s response can only lead to a conclusion that the agency 
did not intend to make the CBE method available to generic 
manufacturers. 
The second tool for unilateral label modification implicated in 
this Comment is known as the Dear Health Care Provider (DHCP) 
letter.91  The DHCP letter is an efficient method by which drug 
manufacturers can communicate directly with prescribers to inform 
them of updates similar in nature to those conveyed in a CBE.92  
Where a manufacturer deems a safety update necessary, the 
manufacturer has the ability to send a direct communication to the 
relevant healthcare providers;93 it is logical that the manufacturer 
would prefer this direct method of disclosure to avoid conflicting use 
by consumers.  The federal regulation pertaining to this approach is 
largely related to format and does not specifically prevent use by 
generic manufacturers.94  FDA regulations, however, define “mailing 
pieces . . . for use by medical practitioners . . . to be labeling,” making 
the DHCP letter off-limits to generic manufacturers for purposes of 
 
 90  Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986); see also 2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 2:386 
(2012). 
It is presumed that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in 
the administrative actor in the best position to develop historical 
familiarity and policy-making expertise.  Because applying an agency’s 
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the 
agency’s unique expertise and policy-making prerogatives, it is 
presumed that the agency’s power authoritatively to interpret its own 
regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated law-making 
power.  
2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra. 
 91  21 C.F.R. § 200.5; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE 
PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING COMMC’N OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFO. 3 (2010), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Guidances/UCM233769.pdf. 
In general, a DHCP letter is used to inform health care practitioners 
about important new information about a drug.  In most cases, the new 
information is about an important new safety concern that could affect 
the decision to use a drug or require some change in behavior by 
health care practitioners, patients, or caregivers to reduce the potential 
for harm from a drug. 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING 
COMMC’N OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFO. 3 (2010), supra. 
 92  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEAR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING 
COMMC’N OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFO. 3 (2010), supra note 91. 
 93  21 C.F.R. § 200.5. 
 94  Id. 
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consumer communication.95 
F. Hatch-Waxman Amendments: The Triumph of Title I 
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments have produced vast success in 
reducing both the time it takes for generic competitors of brand-
name drug manufacturers to get to market and prescription drug 
costs for patients. 
By accelerating the approval process for a generic drug and 
also allowing its producer to begin clinical tests before the 
patent on the innovator drug had expired, the Hatch-
Waxman Act reduced the average delay between patent 
expiration and generic entry from more than three years to 
less than three months for top-selling drugs.96 
Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments “[i]n 
1983, only 35[%] of the top-selling drugs with expired patents 
(excluding antibiotics and drugs approved before 1962) had generic 
versions available.  Today, nearly all do.”97  IMS, a pharmaceutical 
industry leader in data collection and analysis, asserts that from 2004 
to 2010, generic share of total prescriptions in America increased 
from 51% of the market to 74%.98  “The market available for direct 
generic substitution has increased from 61% of total scripts to 81%” 
and “[p]rice competition within the generic market is intense . . . 
contributing to the decline in average therapy costs.”99  A 2007 year-
end review published by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association 
printed a Q & A with the organization’s President and CEO: 
Clearly, there is confidence in the use of generic medicines 
and the recognition of the benefits they provide.  Every day, 
more consumers are realizing that generics provide the 
same medicine and the same results as brands, but at a 
significantly lower cost.  [Consumers] can also be assured 
that generics are just as safe as brands because they are held 
to the same high FDA approval standards.100 
The final sentence of this statement is particularly pertinent to this 
 
 95  21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2). 
 96  See INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at xiii. 
 97  Id. 
 98  The US Pharmaceutical Market: Trends, Issues, & Outlook, supra note 11, at slide 
29. 
 99  Id. 
 100  KATHLEEN JAEGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, GPHA, GENERICS: THE RIGHT CHOICE 
FOR BETTER HEALTH 6 (2008) available at 
http://www.gphaonline.org/sites/default/files/annual-report-2008.pdf. 
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Comment.  Safety extends beyond approval and the extent of clarity 
and completeness in a warning label weighs heavily toward consumer 
perception of safety. 
In addition to significantly reducing the consumer price for 
drugs upon the expiration of their patent, the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments have virtually eliminated the delay between a patent’s 
ceased validity and the time elapsed before generic versions of the 
drug enter the market; “most first generics are available when the 
patent expires.”101  It is common practice for “generic drug 
manufacturers [to] submit applications to the FDA in advance of 
patent expiration or in anticipation of resolution of a patent 
dispute.”102  Generic applications inundate the FDA at present, thus 
“[t]o speed generic approvals, FDA . . . requested authority to collect 
user fees for the review of generic drugs in the FY2011 President’s 
Budget.”103  The FDA, to supplement its resources in the drug 
approval process, leverages user fees on new drug applicants as 
authorized by the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 
2007.104  This desire to expand user fees to generic manufacturers 
reveals agency willingness to increase generic manufacturer costs in 
some areas. 
The ANDA procedure that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
created in 1984 remains substantially unchanged from its original 
format as it pertains to this Comment. 
III. NON-REGULATORY FACTORS DRIVING EXPONENTIAL GROWTH IN 
THE GENERIC SECTOR 
In conjunction with federal legislative emphasis on generic drug 
availability, states and private companies have taken aggressive action 
to increase the utilization of generic drugs.  Pharmaceutical 
substitution of generic equivalents for brand-name drugs began as a 
discretionary practice but is now a practice regulated state-by-state 
that influences prescription volume exponentially.105  Private health 
insurers also aim to capitalize on the savings that generic 
prescriptions provide and do so through patient benefit 
 
 101  See EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 10. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 147, 45831 
(Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-08-01/pdf/2011 
-19332.pdf. 
 105  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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manipulation.106  Government-provided healthcare employs stringent 
policies that stimulate beneficiaries’ utilization of generic 
prescriptions, and proposed legislation exhibits continued 
development of these procedures.107  Finally, the most controversial 
parties to cash in on the generic market are the brand-name 
manufacturers themselves.  Having already invested in the 
compound, many companies remove the brand labeling and market 
their original formulations as generics to take advantage of the 
market influence of the federal and state practices.108 
A. State Substitution Laws 
The substitution of generic drugs for their therapeutic 
equivalent109 at the pharmacy is a common practice today; state law, 
not the FDA, regulates substitution.110  These state laws are presumed 
to be the single largest factor contributing to the fact that “[w]ithin 
six months of patent loss, patients received the generic form of a 
molecule 80% of the time in 2010.”111  Prior to passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, if a physician wrote a prescription indicating 
a brand-name drug, the pharmacist could not legally substitute that 
drug with the generic counterpart.112  Naturally, the extra step for the 
pharmacist of attaining physician consent minimizes the likelihood of 
substitution.  Just five years after the passage of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, “the dispensing of generic drugs on ‘brand-written’ 
prescriptions rather than generically written prescriptions had 
become the chief source of generic drug sales through 
pharmacies.”113  Presently, every state has a law in place governing 
generic substitution of the therapeutic equivalent by pharmacists for 
prescriptions written for a brand-name drug.114  At last count, 
fourteen states mandate generic substitution by pharmacists if “brand 
 
 106  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 107  See discussion infra Parts III.C, III.D. 
 108  See discussion infra Part III.E. 
 109  THE ORANGE BOOK, supra note 10, at vii (“Drug products are considered to be 
therapeutic equivalents only if they are pharmaceutical equivalents and if they can be 
expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to 
patients under the conditions specified in the labeling.”). 
 110  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 3. 
 111  IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 3, at 21. 
 112  INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at box 2. 
 113  Id. (citing RICHARD E. CAVES, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & MARK A. HURWITZ, Patent 
Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1–66 (1991)). 
 114  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at app. A. 
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only” is not indicated by the prescribing physician on the 
prescription.115 
Generic manufacturers especially value substitution laws because 
physicians consistently prescribe brand-name drugs rather than 
generics; this may be due to habit, corporate marketing efforts, or 
concern about the inactive ingredients in generics that vary from 
their brand-name counterparts.116  A study conducted for a 
cholesterol medication revealed that “six months after patent 
expiration, 98[%] of . . . prescriptions were [filled with the generic 
equivalent] in states that did not require patient consent, while less 
than one third of prescriptions were filled by [the generic] in states 
that did require patient consent.”117  This data reveals that, when 
given a choice, patients have a strong preference for brand-name 
drugs.118  This preference may be related to perceptions of value, 
safety, quality, manufacturer reputation or countless other possible 
considerations. 
Beyond state law’s influence, “pharmacists have a financial 
incentive to [dispense] generics, as the mark up received by 
pharmacies is largest for new generics.”119  The wholesale costs of 
generic drugs are generally lower than those of brand-name drugs, 
reducing stocking outlays for pharmacy owners and increasing 
marginal profits.120  The pharmaceutical industry recognizes this 
advantage more consistently with government-sponsored health care 
programs, thus the current reform scheme’s public mandate will 
increase the influence of pharmacists in the allocation of generic and 
brand-name prescription fulfillment.121 
 
 115  Id. (Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and West 
Virginia). 
 116  Id. at 12. 
 117  Id. at 8. 
 118  See id. 
 119  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 8. 
 120  INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at n.10. 
 121   See John M. Coster, Trends in Generic Drug Reimbursement in Medicaid and 
Medicare, U.S. PHARM. (June 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/127/c/21147/. 
Tens of millions of new Americans will have access to health insurance 
starting in 2014 through a combination of Medicaid expansions and an 
increase in the availability of federally sponsored private health 
insurance. Prescription drug coverage will be mandated as part of these 
new health insurance plans.  This means that federally sponsored 
health care plans will pay for even more prescription drugs than they 
do now, and federal reimbursement policies will have more influence 
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B. Private Healthcare Payors 
Private pharmaceutical benefit management companies (PBMs) 
are another prominent external factor on generic prescription 
volume.  PBMs strategically manipulate pricing and coverage in order 
to influence patient behavior in prescription fulfillment.122  The drug 
coverage that a plan provides can diminish the cost burden of brand-
name drugs over the generic equivalent, leading the consumer to 
believe that any perceived superiority of the brand-name drug is 
worth the small price differential.123  To avoid this occurrence and 
reduce their own costs, PBMs utilize tiered formulary coverage; tiers 
generally apply higher copays to brand-names than to generics, 
thereby encouraging patient utilization of the cheaper generic 
drug.124  “An IMS National Prescription Audit shows that a typical 
formulary now charges $6 for generic medications, $29 for preferred 
branded drugs, and $40 or more for non-preferred branded drugs.”125  
This price differential is likely to be  substantial enough to influence 
the average consumer’s choice.  A more straightforward avenue for 
PBMs is brand restriction on formularies.  Formularies are a list of 
drugs a patient can receive coverage for;126 by excluding brand-name 
drugs, the PBM leaves the patient with only one alternative to the 
generic: to pay cash. 
Additional mechanisms engaged to reduce use of more costly 
brand-name pharmaceuticals are deterrents aimed at the prescribing 
physician; two such policy requirements are prior-authorizations and 
step-therapy.127  Prior-authorization mandates placed on specific 
drugs create a requirement for the physician to contact the PBM for 
approval before the patient will receive coverage of the brand-name 
drug in a class where a generic equivalent is available.128  Primary care 
physicians frequently consult over thirty patients per day, placing 
their time at a premium and significantly decreasing the likelihood 
that they will engage in the necessary steps to obtain prior 
 
on how generic drugs are used and how they are dispensed.  
Id. 
 122  INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at 6. 
 123  Id. at 8–9. 
 124  EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at box 1. 
 125  Facts and Myths about Generic Drugs, supra note 62. 
 126  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at n.5. 
 127  See Stephan L. Burton et al., The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Benefit Management, 20 
HEALTH AFF. 150, 151 (2001). 
 128  Id. at n.6. 
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authorization.129  Mitigating this likelihood further, patients do not 
frequently discover the condition of prior authorization until the 
patient brings the prescription to the pharmacy where the pharmacist 
will in turn substitute the brand name with a generic in accordance 
with state laws.130  Step-therapy is basically a series of prerequisites for 
a brand-name drug, under which physicians are required to start with 
a specified drug and gradually work their way up to a drug that the 
PBM considers less preferable, generally for cost reasons.131  Patients 
must fail to respond to the product, react negatively to the drug, or 
otherwise not meet the physician’s goals in order to gain approval for 
movement from one step to the next.132  Step-therapy is a hard stop to 
prior authorization in many cases, requiring prerequisite conditions 
before PBMs will cover a brand-name drug.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, physicians are also frequently incentivized monetarily for 
their prescriptions.133  Given the minefield of mechanisms preventing 
the use of brand-name drugs where generics are available, the market 
status of generics becomes less surprising. 
C. Medicare and Medicaid 
In 1994, the CBO “estimated that the purchase of generic drugs 
reduced the cost of prescriptions . . . by roughly $8 billion to $10 
billion.”134  Preceding an expansion of prescription coverage for 
Medicare recipients in 2007, the Inspector General issued an 
executive summary of the findings of a study assessing the savings 
recognized by the government through patients’ use of generic drugs 
in lieu of brand-name drugs: 
Under Part D, plans have broad discretion to design plan 
benefits and develop their drug utilization management 
tools.  The cost of the Part D prescription drug program for 
2006 was lower than the original estimate of $59 billion, and 
future cost estimates have also been reduced, due in part to 
greater than anticipated generic drug use.135 
 
 129  PHYS. PRAC., Patients-Per-Day Norms, Jan. 1, 2008, 
http://www.physicianspractice.com/qa/patients-day-norms. 
 130  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 131  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at n.8. 
 132  See, e.g., Glossary, BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF TEX., 
http://www.bcbstx.com/partd/2011/glossary.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
 133  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at n.7. 
 134  INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERICS, supra note 50, at 13. 
 135  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, GENERIC DRUG UTILIZATION IN THE MEDICARE 
PART D PROGRAM, at i (Nov. 2007), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei 
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Government Medicare and Medicaid programs recognize the cost 
benefits in a similar fashion to private insurers discussed in the 
preceding section,136 but by nature, the patients they insure have 
insignificant choice in their insurance plans—Medicare and 
Medicaid serve the elderly and the poor.137  Characteristics that 
qualify them for the medical coverage they receive also make them 
less capable of absorbing drastic medical harm that will go 
uncompensated by generic manufacturers based on the current 
preemption of state tort liability, discussed infra. 
In 2007, Medicare Part D, the prescription-drug benefit plan 
under Medicare, saw 90% of prescriptions written for brand-name 
drugs with generic counterparts filled with the generic option.138  
According to the CBO, “[t]hat figure reflects the strong financial 
incentives for . . . enrollees to use generics when available.”139  Most 
recently, 2010 data reveals clear incentive for maintaining growth in 
the use of generics; “Medicaid paid on average approximately $200 
for each monthly brand prescription, compared to just $20 for a 
month’s prescription in the generic version. . . . By increasing generic 
utilization in Medicaid by just one percentage point, the government 
and taxpayers would save more than $500 million each year.”140  
These patient populations are likely to see dramatic impact stemming 
from the holding in Mensing. 
D.  Proposed and Enacted Legislation Favoring Generics 
Present reform of healthcare maintains similar goals to those 
perpetually sought by the FDA in more modern actions: affordability 
and availability.  While the costs of expanding general public 
coverage are high,141 this is inevitably offset by the FDA’s centralized 
guidance of patients’ drug choices to generics: 
 
-05-07-00130.pdf. 
 136  Id. at iii. 
 137  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov (last visited Jan. 
16, 2012). 
 138  EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at 7. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Press Release, GPhA Commends Bipartisan Effort to Lower Health Care Costs 
Through Increased Use of Affordable Generic Medicines (Nov. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2011/gpha-commends-bipartisan 
-effort-lower-health-care-costs-through-increased-. 
 141  See One Year Later—GPhA Presses Need to Generate Savings in Health Care Reform 
Efforts, supra note 8 (“By lowering eligibility requirements, the ACA will add 
approximately 16 to 18 million new lives to the current 60 million Medicaid 
beneficiaries.”). 
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For brand-name drugs . . . plans will pay 2.5[%] of their cost 
in 2013, increasing to 25[%] by 2020 and beyond.  For 
generic drugs purchased in that spending range, plans will 
pay 7[%] of the cost in 2011; that coverage will increase 
each year to reach a total of 75[%] by 2020.142 
Generic expansion is not limited to drugs approved by ANDA; 
further reform efforts focus on extending the availability of 
biologics.143  Biologics have a tendency to be exceptionally costly 
because they are generated from living organisms as opposed to their 
manufactured pharmaceutical counterparts.144  Prior to current 
reform, manufacturers were not able to produce these drugs in 
generic form through an abbreviated process.145  “The abbreviated 
pathway for approval of biosimilar biologic drugs under the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, within the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act” creates a new avenue for 
savings.146  The subsequent focus of private and government 
pharmaceutical benefit plans will be to incentivize patients’ use of the 
cheaper equivalent; most likely, this will be accomplished by the 
means discussed supra.  Consistent with the historic promotion of 
affordability and availability, this act aims to reduce as many barriers 
to consumer-use as possible while maintaining the safety and efficacy 
of the regulated drugs. 
E. Authorized Generics—If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them 
As introduced above, the entrance of generic competition takes 
the vast majority of a brand-name drug manufacturer’s market share 
in a brief time span.  Exorbitant costs of innovation create a need for 
substantial incentive; patent protection for novel drugs provides just 
that, but in a capitalist market, this does not seem to be sufficient.  
Given the comprehensive preference for generic prescription 
fulfillment in the private and public sectors, it is not entirely 
 
 142  EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at 3. 
 143  Biologics represent the cutting edge of medicine, “and, in time, may offer the 
most effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions that 
presently have no other treatments available.”  This line of drugs is comprised of “a 
wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood components, allergenics, 
somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins.”  What Are 
“Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsand 
Tobacco/CBER/ucm133077.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).  
 144  EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 10, at 18. 
 145  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at 10. 
 146  Id. 
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surprising that brand-name manufacturers have found a surreptitious 
way to capitalize on the self-perpetuating market of generics.  In the 
pharmaceutical industry, the practice of brand-name manufacturers 
removing original packaging from their drugs and relabeling them as 
generics is referred to as production of an authorized generic.147 
This practice has generated attention because it allows brand 
manufacturers to usurp an exclusivity period granted to the first 
generic manufacturer to successfully challenge a patent and come to 
market with a competitor.148  This Comment does not focus on the 
independent complexities of this subject; instead, the existence of 
authorized generics is relevant because Mensing seems to preempt 
state tort liability for brand manufacturers if they market their 
original compound as a generic.  Although the brand manufacturer 
would be liable for failing to warn consumers under the holding in 
Wyeth, they escape such liability through a mere package change;149 
this bizarre result cannot be an intention of the legislature.  In 
essence, producers of a product can easily shield themselves from 
consumer liability and are subject to no motivating requirement to 
monitor safety.  By this substantial loophole, all parties involved in 
marketing an inherently dangerous product have accountability only 
to maintain the status quo, regardless of what new dangers may come 
to their attention.150 
 
 147  See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeveloped 
andApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDA 
Generics/ucm126389.htm#WHAT_IS_AG (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
An “authorized generic drug” is a listed drug as defined in § 314.3 that 
has been approved under subsection 505(c) of the act and is marketed, 
sold, or distributed directly or indirectly to retail class of trade with 
either labeling, packaging (other than repackaging as the listed drug in 
blister packs, unit doses, or similar packaging for use in institutions), 
product code, labeler code, trade name, or trade mark that differs 
from that of the listed drug. 
Id. 
 148  The Hatch-Waxman Amendments granted a 180-day exclusivity period to the 
first generic manufacturer in order to motivate prompt entrance of competition.  21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: 
SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT, at i (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf (“[C]ourts have ruled 
that 180-day exclusivity does not preclude a brand-name company from entering with 
its own generic because it already has approval for its product.”). 
 149  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 150  With the exception of a footnote to the dissenting opinion in Mensing, the 
impact of that case’s holding on authorized generics is not illuminated.  131 U.S. 
2567, 2589 n.12 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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IV. CHECKS, BALANCES, AND LIABILITY 
The success of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and resultant 
boom in the prescription-drug market placed an enormous burden 
on an already beleaguered FDA.  The long-standing relationship 
between federal regulation and state tort law is crucial to the safety of 
the prescription drug market.  While preemption doctrine is 
implicated in considering federal regulation of consumer products as 
it impacts public health in the case at bar, it substantially hinders one 
underlying policy of all FDA legislation—safety.  This Part establishes 
several supporting reasons for this assertion. 
A. The FDA’s Burden 
Based on the FDA’s inception and development through present 
day, it is arguable that its most significant underlying policy is that of 
safety in products that members of the public consume.  Within the 
FDA, the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE) and the 
Office of New Drugs (OND) equally share the role of post-approval 
safety oversight,151 both operating under the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (CDER).152  Within OSE, there are five 
divisions, three of which focus on post-approval safety.153  Two 
Divisions of Pharmacovigilance “detect and assess safety signals for all 
marketed drug products,” and the Division of Epidemiology 
functions to “evaluate various postmarketing surveillance tools that 
may be incorporated into risk management strategies.”154  In a 
recently published performance self-evaluation, the FDA noted that 
“the number of generic applications submitted to CDER’s generic 
drug program has grown considerably over the past decade—nearly 
three-fold since 2001—outpacing the growth in program 
personnel.”155 
 
 151  John Jenkins, Gerald Del Pan & Janet Woodcock, Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the [OND] and the [OSE] in the [CDER], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformati
onforPatientsandProviders/UCM111520.pdf.  It is unclear, however, whether this 
division of responsibility has been updated despite its pre-determined expiration on 
June 16, 2010. 
 152  Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacc
o/CDER/ucm106491.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 153  Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE)-Divisions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacc
o/CDER/ucm169536.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 154  Id. 
 155  DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2012 ONLINE PERFORMANCE APPENDIX 1, 
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In a report requested by the United States Senate Committee on 
Finance, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
made reference to over thirty years of “[c]oncerns about the FDA’s 
management of safety issues for drugs approved for marketing.”156  In 
expanding on this unremitting issue, the GAO revisited a 2006 report 
where it found that: “OSE management had not effectively overseen 
postmarket drug safety and lacked systematic information;” the FDA 
routinely failed to track “progression of postmarketing studies that 
FDA had requested;” and that the “FDA faced constraints in its access 
to data that allow[s] it to monitor the safety of marketed drugs . . . 
[and] limited resources for staff training and supportive 
technology.”157  The GAO report noted that the FDA’s workload 
continuously increases as they take on new responsibilities by 
legislation and in 2009, they continued to be understaffed in the area 
of postmarket drug safety.158  Although regulations require that 
adverse events are reported and compiled in a central location for 
the purpose of monitoring safety, the utilization of this data is subject 
to doubt—OSE staff members reported to the GAO that “workload 
 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms 
/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM242730.pdf. 
 156  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-68, FDA HAS BEGUN EFFORTS TO 
ENHANCE POSTMARKET SAFETY, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter POSTMARKET DRUG SAFETY], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1068.pdf.  This is only one of multiple studies 
revealing the inability of the FDA to sufficiently monitor the safety of pharmaceutical 
drugs over a lifespan of market availability.  See also BOARD ON POPULATION HEALTH 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND 
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193–94 (2007), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11750&page=R1. 
There is widespread agreement that resources for postmarketing drug 
safety work are especially inadequate and that resource limitations have 
hobbled the [FDA’s] ability to improve and expand this essential 
component of its mission.  Continued resource shortages will impede 
the agency’s ability to use new and future scientific and technological 
advances in drug research across the lifecycle.  In particular, the 
limited resources could impede the agency’s ability to detect risks of 
new drugs in a timely fashion, analyze emerging drug safety data, and 
effectively communicate that information to the public. 
BOARD ON POPULATION HEALTH AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG 
SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193–94 (2007), supra.  
 157 POSTMARKET DRUG SAFETY, supra note 156, at 10–11. 
 158  Id. at 31 (In a survey of OSE and OND staff members  “[60%] . . . of the 
employees said that they either were not able to meet their postmarket drug safety 
responsibilities during an average workweek or were only able to meet these 
responsibilities by working overtime.”). 
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demands prevent them from reviewing these reports.”159  The report 
estimated that the OSE would need to more than double the size of 
its current staff in order to adequately monitor postmarket safety.160  
Even where a budget for staff is allocated, the FDA has been unable 
to fill vacancies that account for half of the positions established for 
drug safety experts over several consecutive years.161 
In February 2011, the GAO returned to the FDA to assess 
progress in resolving the “high-risk” issues noted in the 2009 report.162  
The report enumerated almost identical concerns to the 2006 and 
2009 issues, adding that “FDA staff have expressed concern about 
their ability to meet a growing postmarket workload, with some 
maintaining that their premarket responsibilities are considered a 
higher priority.”163  Premarket safety is based on the trials required for 
a NDA; these trials are typically comprised of a small subset of “the 
population that will ultimately use the drug.  Patients typically receive 
the drug over a short duration.  Elderly persons, pregnant women, 
and patients who have other medical problems may be excluded, thus 
enrolled patients may not reflect the patients who will take the 
drug.”164  A perceived focus on premarket safety is exceptionally 
alarming given the inherent weaknesses of clinical trials for 
establishing safety prior to approval. 
B. State Tort Failure-to-Warn Claims 
The FDA’s responsibility for drug oversight includes monitoring 
“the 11,000 drugs on the market,”165 while expediting approval of new 
drug applications in under-funded, under-staffed circumstances.  The 
need for tort liability to inspire self-regulation by manufacturers in a 
complementary fashion is self-evident.  The FDA itself has 
“recognize[d] that product liability plays an important role in 
consumer protection.”166  The Supreme Court has also expressed the 
view that “obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed 
to be, a potent method of governing conduct.”167  Preemption of state 
 
 159  Id. at 33. 
 160  Id. at 34. 
 161  Id. at 38. 
 162  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-278, HIGH-RISK SERIES 115 (1998). 
 163  Id. at 116–17. 
 164  POSTMARKET DRUG SAFETY, supra note 156, at 9. 
 165  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009).   
 166  Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients [and] 
Preemption of Disclosure Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 3944-01, 3948 (Jan. 27, 1994). 
 167  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 510 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
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tort law in the context of pharmaceutical products emphasizes the 
FDA’s history of inadequacy in the realm of post-approval safety 
updates.168  The holding of Wyeth, discussed infra, enables plaintiffs to 
recover damages if they can prove that a manufacturer of a brand-
name pharmaceutical product acquired knowledge of a danger posed 
by their products, but not adequately disclosed by their labels, after 
obtaining FDA approval.169 
Allegations of state tort law violations are generally drawn from 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.170  The comments of the 
Restatement shed light upon the underlying meaning in failure to 
warn: “In order to prevent [a] product from being unreasonably 
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, 
on the container, as to its use.”171  More specific to the inherently 
dangerous nature of pharmaceutical products, the comments 
elucidate reluctance to impose broad liability, but instead aim to 
generate consumer awareness and prevent harmful or fraudulent 
practices.172 
Tort liability then, is in harmony with the FDA’s goals of 
maintaining public safety without preventing innovation and access 
to beneficial drugs.  The FDA has iterated this proposition: 
FDA does not believe that the evolution of state tort law will 
cause the development of standards that would be at odds 
with the agency’s regulations.  FDA’s regulations establish 
 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). 
 168  In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007).  
 169  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 170  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 171  Id. at cmt. j. 
 172  Id. at cmt. k. 
There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended 
and ordinary use.  These are especially common in the field of 
drugs. . . .  Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by 
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably 
dangerous.  The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the 
like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to 
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.  It is also true in 
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of 
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there 
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, 
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the 
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.  
Id. 
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the minimal standards necessary, but were not intended to 
preclude the states from imposing additional labeling 
requirements.  States may authorize additional labeling but 
they cannot reduce, alter, or eliminate FDA-required 
labeling.173 
In fact, until quite recently, the FDA had emphasized its opposition 
to preempting tort law with regard to drug labeling.174  It is worth 
noting that the FDA’s unsettled position is itself relevant to a finding 
of preemption, and would generally lead a court to accord the agency 
interpretation less weight.175 
In cases where patients injured by generic versions of 
pharmaceutical products have attempted to hold the manufacturer of 
the reference-listed drug liable, they have been categorically 
unsuccessful.176  The element of causation is only met if the injured 
party in a pharmaceutical products liability claim establishes that he 
or she has actually ingested the defendant’s product.177  This 
substantially increases the bearing of substitution laws and 
preemption in FDA regulated products; because federal law does not 
recognize private litigants with a right of action, consumer injuries 
will be borne solely by the consumer if tort law is preempted. 
C. Preemption Doctrine and Healthcare 
Where a conflict exists between federal and state law, courts rely 
on preemption doctrine to find the state law a nullity.  This power 
inures from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.178  Federal 
preemption is an issue that frequently comes before the U.S. 
Supreme Court and is contentious for what opponents see as a 
usurpation of state independence and what proponents see as a 
 
 173  Prescription Drug Product Labeling [and] Medication Guide Requirements, 
63 Fed. Reg. 66378-01, 66384 (Dec. 1, 1998). 
 174  “FDA has determined that this proposed rule does not contain policies that 
have federalism implications or that preempt State law.”  Requirements on Content 
and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics [and] 
Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81082, 81103 (Dec. 
22, 2000). 
 175  While agency consistency is a factor in a court’s consideration, it does not 
entirely eliminate the deference they receive in such considerations.  Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984). 
 176  See, e.g., Stoddard v. Wyeth Inc., 630 F.Supp.2d 631 (E.D.N.C. 2009); Schrock 
v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F.Supp.2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 
F.Supp.2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 177  Absent a duty of care to an injured party, a defendant will not be found liable 
for breach.  Levine v. Wyeth Inc., 684 F.Supp.2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
 178  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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valuable lubricant for interstate commerce.179  The Court has 
established three specific grounds by which courts should find 
preemption of state law: 
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its 
enactments pre-empt state law. . . .  Second, in the absence 
of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where 
it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the 
Federal Government to occupy exclusively. . . .  Finally, state 
law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law.  Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where 
it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state 
and federal requirements.180 
Where preemption is not explicit, “[t]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone.”181 
In the event that federal agencies exist to oversee specific areas 
of interstate commerce, those agencies are on notice by Executive 
Order to minimize preemption of state law to the greatest extent 
possible.182  State tort laws are a common area of preemptive question 
with respect to drugs and the FDA’s oversight of them.183  Recently, a 
2008 committee report cited to extensive evidence of the FDA’s 
acceptance of “state lawsuits as providing a valuable complement to 
the agency’s regulation of these products.  The agency has asserted 
that these cases help to uncover risks that are unknown to the agency 
at the time of approval and that they provide an important additional 
layer of consumer protection.”184  In addition to its supporting role as 
 
 179  Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State 
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimonies 





 180  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 
 181  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 182  Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 153 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“Any regulatory 
preemption of State law shall be restricted to the minimum level necessary to achieve 
the objectives of the statute pursuant to which the regulations are promulgated.”). 
 183  Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State 
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony 
of Senator Russ Feingold), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings 
/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da12d7b7c&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476
862f735da12d7b7c-0-2. 
 184  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 
MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES 
1 (Oct. 2008) (Report also noted that “assertions about the ability of the drug 
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a negative motivator, there is a strong presumption against 
preemption in regulation of health and safety because of the 
traditional oversight by the states in this field.185 
D. FDA Regulation of Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers Does Not 
Preempt State Tort Liability 
As introduced above, Wyeth v. Levine involved a patient who 
received an injection of the brand-name drug Phenergan, an anti-
nausea medication, by a method that embodied a significant risk of 
drastic consequences.186  The tragic result for the patient, a 
professional musician, was amputation of her arm following 
irreversible gangrene.187  Investigation revealed numerous missed 
opportunities for the offending method to be circumvented through 
an updated warning to the pharmaceutical product’s label.188  This 
case exemplifies substantial support for the key role that state tort law 
plays in stimulating self-regulation of pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
The defendant pharmaceutical company argued that the plaintiff’s 
state tort law claims for failure-to-warn were preempted by 
impossibility; specifically the defendant manufacturer claimed that 
federal regulation prevented it from unilaterally changing its label.189  
The Court vehemently rejected this argument in a six-to-three 
majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens.190 
In Wyeth v. Levine, the trial record revealed an example of 
correspondence concerning the warning section of a label between 
the FDA and the brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer over a 
period of seventeen years.191  The communication concerned the very 
risk that led to amputation of the plaintiff’s arm, an injury that had 
been reported to the manufacturer over twenty times prior to the 
plaintiff’s fate.192  This serves as an illustration of an overtaxed 
regulatory agency overlooking crucial data, which had been directly 
reported to it, with catastrophic results.193 
 
approval process to ensure accurate and up-to-date drug labels [were erroneous].”). 
 185  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 186  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 187  Id. at 559. 
 188  Id. at 561–62. 
 189  Id. at 562–63. 
 190  Id. at 558. 
 191  Id. at 561–62. 
 192  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563. 
 193  This case is illustrative of the inevitable oversights resulting from an 
overburdened FDA: Phenergan, the drug which caused Levine’s injury, obtained 
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The Wyeth Court went on to discuss the “two cornerstones of our 
pre-emption jurisprudence.”194  To first determine Congress’s intent, 
the Court discussed the history of the relevant federal regulation: 
As it enlarged the FDA’s powers to protect the public health 
and assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs, 
Congress took care to preserve state law.  The 1962 
amendments added a saving clause, indicating that a 
provision of state law would only be invalidated upon a 
direct and positive conflict with the FDCA.  Consistent with 
that provision, state common-law suits continued unabated 
despite FDA regulation. . . . And when Congress enacted an 
express pre-emption provision for medical devices in 1976, 
it declined to enact such a provision for prescription 
drugs.195 
The Court rejected the pharmaceutical company’s argument that 
unilaterally altering its warning would have put it in violation of 
federal laws, “the very idea that the FDA would bring an enforcement 
action against a manufacturer for strengthening a warning pursuant 
to the CBE regulation is difficult to accept.”196  Wyeth’s argument that 
the FDA was both the sole authority governing safety labeling, and 
shouldered complete responsibility  for it, was unreliable: 
It has remained a central premise of federal drug 
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for 
the content of its label at all times.  It is charged both with 
crafting an adequate label and with ensuring that its 
warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the 
market.  Indeed, prior to 2007, the FDA lacked the 
 
FDA approval in 1955.  In 1973 and 1976, label changes were made by Wyeth, the 
manufacturer of Phenergan, through supplements to their NDA.  In 1981, Wyeth 
submitted a third supplement; discussions ensued intermittently over a span of 
seventeen years.  In 1988, Wyeth submitted revised labeling regarding the risks 
accompanying a certain method of delivery; unfortunately, this was the same method 
of delivery that led to the amputation of Levine’s arm and the injury of many other 
patients over several years.  The FDA failed to respond to Wyeth’s submission, 
instead instructing them to “retain verbiage in current label.”  Id. at 562 (citation 
omitted).  In 1998, seventeen years after Wyeth’s proposed label change, the FDA 
did respond to the supplement but still failed to address the offending method of 
delivery.  Levine’s injury was incurred in 2000, approximately two decades after the 
potential issue was brought to the attention of, and went unaddressed by, the FDA.  
This calls into question the FDA’s ability to be the sole responsible entity for the 
safety of a market of over 11,000 generic drugs.  Id. at 561–62. 
 194  Id. at 565. 
 195  Id. at 567 (internal quotations and editing omitted). 
 196  Id. at 570. 
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authority to order manufacturers to revise their labels.197 
Restricting safety oversight to the FDA alone would eviscerate the 
complementary nature of state tort liability for the manufacturers of 
pharmaceutical products.198 
“Second, ‘in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in . . . a field 
which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.’”199  The Court responded adversely to 
Wyeth’s argument that the legislative intent was to create a floor and 
a ceiling for liability within the FDA regulations.  The Court 
considered the absence of available remedies to patients within the 
FDA’s regulatory framework indicative of congressional intent: 
Congress did not provide a federal remedy for consumers 
harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or 
in any subsequent amendment.  Evidently, it determined 
that widely available state rights of action provided 
appropriate relief for injured consumers.  It may also have 
recognized that state-law remedies further consumer 
protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe 
and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings.200 
The Court posited that if state tort liability had been considered an 
“obstacle to [Congress’s] objectives, it surely would have enacted an 
express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70-
year history.”201  As discussed supra, agency regulation should avoid 
preempting state law to the greatest extent possible, and where 
 
 197  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–71. 
 198  The Wyeth Court emphasized the imperative role of state tort law in a rational 
manner: 
The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the 
market, and manufacturers have superior access to information about 
their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge.  
State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide 
incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.  
They also serve a distinct compensatory function that may 
motivate injured persons to come forward with information.  Failure-to-
warn actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA’s premise that 
manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their drug 
labeling at all times.  Thus, the FDA long maintained that state law 
offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that 
complements FDA regulation. 
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.  
 199  Id. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).   
 200  Id. at 574 (internal citation omitted). 
 201  Id. 
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unavoidable, should make preemption a clear intention.  To the 
contrary, “despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption 
provision for medical devices . . . (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)), 
Congress has not enacted such a provision for prescription drugs.”202  
The Court construed Congress’s “silence on the issue, coupled with 
its certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, . . . [as] 
powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be 
the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”203  The 
justification for preemption is subject to exceptionally heightened 
skepticism where Congress indicates its awareness of state regulation 
in a field of federal interest, but declines to explicitly deny their 
coexistence.204 
The final contention considered by the Court concerned the 
FDA’s preamble to a 2006 publication.  The FDA’s statement 
expressed that “failure-to-warn claims ‘threaten FDA’s statutorily 
prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for 
 
 202  Id.  President Barack Obama delivered a memorandum clearly stating his 
policy on federal preemption of state law: 
An understanding of the important role of State governments in our 
Federal system is reflected in longstanding practices by executive 
departments and agencies, which have shown respect for the 
traditional prerogatives of the States. . . . To ensure that executive 
departments and agencies include statements of preemption in 
regulations only when such statements have a sufficient legal basis: 
 
1. Heads of departments and agencies should not include in regulatory 
preambles statements that the department or agency intends to 
preempt State law through the regulation except where preemption 
provisions are also included in the codified regulation. 
 
2. Heads of departments and agencies should not include preemption 
provisions in codified regulations except where such provisions would 
be justified under legal principles governing preemption, including the 
principles [of federalism]. 
 
3. Heads of departments and agencies should review regulations issued 
within the past 10 years that contain statements . . . intended by the 
department or agency to preempt State law. . . . Where the head of a 
department or agency determines that [preemption is un]justified, the 
head of that department or agency should initiate appropriate action, 
which may include amendment of the relevant regulation. 
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Preemption (May 20, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential 
-memorandum-regarding-preemption. 
 203  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575. 
 204  Id. (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
166–67 (1989)). 
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evaluating and regulating drugs.’”205  The Court made clear that it 
found this assertion particularly unpersuasive: “The weight we accord 
the agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme 
depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.”206  
The preamble statement was particularly inconsistent with the FDA’s 
announcement that preceded the 2006 rule.  “[I]n December 2000, it 
explained that the rule would ‘not contain policies that have 
federalism implications or that preempt State law.’”207 
Further, the preamble is at odds with what evidence we have 
of Congress’ [sic] purposes, and it reverses the FDA’s own 
longstanding position without providing a reasoned 
explanation, including any discussion of how state law has 
interfered with the FDA’s regulation of drug labeling 
during decades of coexistence. . . .  For instance, in 1998, 
the FDA stated that it did “not believe that the evolution of 
state tort law [would] cause the development of standards 
that would be at odds with the agency’s regulations.”  It 
further noted that, in establishing “minimal standards” for 
drug labels, it did not intend “to preclude the states from 
imposing additional labeling requirements.”208 
The Court’s reasoning reflects a policy of setting reasonable 
expectations through consistency. 
V. PREEMPTION OF STATE FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS AGAINST GENERIC 
MANUFACTURERS 
In the years following Wyeth, district courts consistently found 
that FDA regulations did not preempt the state tort law applicable to 
the adequacy of brand-name pharmaceutical drug label warnings.  
However, district courts clearly struggled with the application of the 
holding in Wyeth to generic drug manufacturers whose labels were 
governed by a framework materially different from that of brand-
name manufacturers.209  The Supreme Court’s answer to that 
question in Mensing210 came as a shock not only to the courts in the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, but also to four of the Justices on the 
bench.  In a five-to-four decision, the divide between the justices was 
palpable. 
 
 205  Id. (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (2006)). 
 206  Id. at 1201. 
 207  Id. (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 81103 (2000)). 
 208  Id. (quoting 63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (1998)). 
 209  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 210  131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
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As introduced above, the cases of Mensing and Demahy 
(“Plaintiffs”), consolidated for purposes of certiorari, sought to 
answer the question “whether, and to what extent, generic 
manufacturers may change their labels after initial FDA approval.”211  
The drug at issue was metoclopramide, the generic equivalent of the 
brand-name drug Reglan.  Due to Plaintiffs’ respective state 
substitution laws, in spite of the fact that their physicians had 
prescribed the brand-name drug, both received the generic 
alternative.212  The FDA approved Reglan in 1980 to be marketed for 
the purpose of increasing the speed of food through the digestive 
tract; generic manufacturers entered the market five years later.213  In 
1985, the Reglan and metoclopramide labels were “modified to warn 
that ‘tardive dyskinesia . . . may develop in patients treated with 
metoclopramide,’ . . . and ‘therapy longer than 12 weeks has not 
been evaluated and cannot be recommended.’”214  In 2004, Reglan 
requested that the label be strengthened to state that “therapy should 
not exceed 12 weeks in duration.”215  Plaintiffs were prescribed the 
drug prior to that year.  Not until 2009 did the FDA issue a black-box 
warning for the drug’s association with tardive dyskinesia when used 
longer than twelve weeks.216  The timeline of this series of events 
spanned nearly a quarter of a century, yet the first reports of a nexus 
between the side effect and the drug were reported as early as 1978.217 
Plaintiffs asserted that the manufacturers of metoclopramide 
had caused each of their injuries in violation of tort laws in their 
respective states.218  “They claimed that ‘despite mounting evidence 
 
 211  Id. at 2574. 
 212  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERICS, supra note 9, at app. A (Minnesota and 
Louisiana, the Plaintiffs’ states, are not amongst the states with the most aggressive 
substitution laws.). 
 213  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572. 
 214  Id. 
 215  Id.  
 216  Id. at 2573. 
 217  Report of Expert Steven H. Lamm, M.D. D.T.P.H., Burnett et al, v. Wyeth 
Pharm. Inc., No. 3:08CV00575, 2008 WL 5653557 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2008). 
 218  The decision, however, does not turn on interpretation of the state laws.  See 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 
782, 788 (Minn. 1977)); Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 269–70 (5th 
Cir. 2002)).  Under Minnesota law, which applies to Mensing’s lawsuit, “where the 
manufacturer . . . of a product has actual or constructive knowledge of danger to 
users, the . . . manufacturer has a duty to give warning of such dangers.”  Mensing, 
131 S. Ct. at 2573.  Similarly, under Louisiana law applicable to Demahy’s lawsuit, “a 
manufacturer’s duty to warn includes a duty to provide adequate instructions for safe 
use of a product.”  Id. 
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that long term metoclopramide use carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia 
far greater than that indicated on the label,’ none of the 
Manufacturers had changed their labels to adequately warn of that 
danger.”219  The manufacturers in both cases 
urged that federal law pre-empted the state tort claims.  
According to the Manufacturers, federal statutes and FDA 
regulations required them to use the same safety and 
efficacy labeling as their brand-name counterparts.  This 
means, they argued, that it was impossible to simultaneously 
comply with both federal law and any state tort-law duty that 
required them to use a different label.  The Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits rejected the 
Manufacturers’ arguments and held that Mensing and 
Demahy’s claims were not pre-empted.220 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the issue turned on “whether, 
and to what extent, generic manufacturers may change their labels 
after initial FDA approval.”221  Written by Justice Thomas, the majority 
proceeded to take the complete opposite stance to the Court’s 
opinion in Wyeth, in which it found the FDA’s preference to have 
complete dominion.222 
Curiously, this is in spite of the FDA’s submission of two separate 
briefs in support of respondents.  The FDA’s initial brief filed on 
November 2, 2010, recommended dismissal of certiorari.  The initial 
discussion of congressional intent emphasized the lack of boundaries 
that would ensue if the Court were to find preemption: 
 
 219  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 
(8th Cir. 2009)); see also Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 220  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573. 
 221  Id. at 2574.  On petition for rehearing, however, the respondents attempted to 
challenge this holding by logic established in Wyeth.  According to their argument, at 
no point are drug manufacturers required to market a product they know is unsafe by 
state tort standards, thus giving generic manufacturers the ability to temporarily 
withdraw their product from the market until its label can be made sufficient; as 
such, the state and federal laws could have been simultaneously adhered to.  
Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing at 3, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-
993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (citing Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 591 (2009)). 
 222  Justice Thomas in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009), authored a 
separate concurrence that strongly emphasized his concern about the over-extension 
of the preemption doctrine.  Justice Thomas iterated that the separation of powers 
made it crucial that Congress’s preemptive purpose be explicit in the language of the 
relevant statute in order for a court to find that state laws were preempted by federal 
regulations.  “Pre-emption must turn on whether state law conflicts with the text of 
the relevant federal statute or with the federal regulations authorized by that text.”  
Id. at 588. 
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Certainly, those Amendments were intended in part to 
accelerate the availability of low-cost generic drugs.  “But no 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”  That principle 
is particularly apt here because the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments amend, and thus must be read in tandem with, 
the rest of the FDCA.  As Wyeth explains, the FDCA’s 
purpose is to “bolster consumer protection against harmful 
products,” and it reflects Congress’s determination that 
widely available state rights of action provide appropriate 
compensatory relief for injured consumers.  Nothing in the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments suggests that Congress 
intended to abandon those principles in the case of generic 
drugs.223 
The brief went on to emphasize the Supreme Court’s emphasis 
on certain inaction by Congress in Wyeth: 
Moreover, this Court reasoned in Wyeth that, given 
Congress’s 1976 enactment of an express preemption 
provision for medical devices and its “certain awareness of 
the prevalence of state tort litigation,” Congress “surely 
would have enacted an express preemption provision” if it 
believed that all “state-law suits posed an obstacle to its 
objectives.”  That reasoning applies here as well.  Indeed, if 
it did not, individuals harmed by inadequately labeled 
generic drugs would (on petitioners’ view) have no remedy, 
while individuals who took the same drug with the same 
labeling in its brand-name form would (by virtue of Wyeth) 
have a state tort remedy.  “If Congress had intended to 
deprive injured parties of a long available form of 
compensation”—and to do so in such an inconsistent 
manner—”it surely would have expressed that intent more 
clearly.”224 
In spite of the deference afforded to an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulations, the Court declined to adhere to the FDA’s position. 
Following grant of certiorari, the FDA filed a second brief in 
favor of Plaintiffs on March 2, 2011.225  The FDA argued that the 
method by which the drug had gained approval was not controlling 
 
 223  Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039), 2010 WL 4339894, at 
*20-21 [hereinafter First Brief for the United States] (citing Dolan v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 
2533, 2547 (2010)). 
 224 Id. at *21 (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575). 
 225  Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-0993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL 
741927 [hereinafter Second Brief for the United States]. 
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in terms of the manufacturers’ responsibility for updating their labels 
to conform to safety requirements.226  The FDA further asserted that 
finding preemption would capriciously allow manufacturers to avoid 
such responsibilities and arbitrarily deny relief to injured patients.227  
Although there is substantial deference given to the FDA’s 
interpretation of its regulations, the Court clarified here that courts 
“do not defer to an agency’s ultimate conclusion about whether state 
law should be pre-empted.”228 
In spite of the FDA’s arguments, the Court found that the FDA 
regulations required the drug manufacturer of an ANDA-approved 
product to maintain an identical label to the reference-listed drug for 
which it was approved as a generic equivalent.229  In assessing the CBE 
method available to drug manufacturers to unilaterally alter labels for 
the purpose of increasing drug warnings, the majority found that the 
generic manufacturers’ necessary uniformity with the list drug 
foreclosed their ability to unilaterally do so, even if it was necessary.  
The majority made a similar finding in reference to other tools, such 
as the DHCP letter, available to brand-name drug manufacturers 
where urgency necessitates a label change in the absence of FDA 
approval beforehand.230  If the generic drug changed its warning label 
 
 226  Id. at *24. 
 227  Id. at *26. 
When, as here, federal law requires a manufacturer to act to update its 
labeling, a State may impose a similar duty and consequent damages 
liability for failing to meet that duty. . . . That framework for generic 
drugs is in harmony with Wyeth’s rule for brand-name drugs: 
Irrespective of whether a drug is approved under an NDA or an ANDA, 
if the drug was misbranded due to new safety information not reflected 
in its labeling, then the plaintiff’s claims are not preempted.  The 
manufacturer was under a federal duty to revise its federally approved 
labeling and FDA gave it the ability to seek such changes.  Petitioners, 
by contrast, argue that they enjoy a free pass accorded to virtually no 
other manufacturer regarding product labeling - in the field of drugs 
or otherwise.  Individuals harmed by inadequately labeled generic 
drugs would (on petitioners’ view) have no remedy against the 
manufacturer, while individuals who took the same drug with the same 
labeling in its brand-name form would (by virtue of Wyeth) have such a 
remedy. 
Id.   
 228  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 n.3. 
 229  The federal preemption doctrines discussed supra required an explicit 
foreclosure by the actual words of the regulations in order to find preemption; it is 
difficult to understand the majority’s strained interpretation of the statute to find 
conflict preemption given the lack of explicit preemption.   
 230  The Court cited to the FDA’s concern that “if generic drug manufacturers, but 
not the brand-name manufacturer, sent such letters, that would inaccurately imply a 
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on its own it would, per se, be in violation of FDA regulations and 
lose its status of approval for marketing.  The Court’s articulation of 
the enquiry for impossibility preemption turned on “whether the 
private party could independently do under federal law what state law 
requires of it.”231  Because the state tort laws required the 
manufacturers to change their label in spite of this, the Court found 
that they were federally preempted by the manufacturers’ resultant 
impossibility to comport with both laws.  In sum, FDA regulations 
require “that the warning labels of a brand-name drug and its generic 
copy must always be the same—thus, generic drug manufacturers 
have an ongoing federal duty of ‘sameness.’”232  In closing, Justice 
Thomas “acknowledge[d] the unfortunate hand that federal drug 
regulation . . . dealt [the patients] and others similarly situated.”233  
The majority further clarified that it did not necessarily consider the 
holding reasonable; “it is not th[e] Court’s task to decide whether the 
statutory scheme established by Congress is unusual or even 
bizarre.”234 
The dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, persuasively disagreed with the 
state of the law as the majority read it.235  In disagreeing with the 
 
therapeutic difference between the brand and generic drugs and thus could be 
impermissibly ‘misleading.’”  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576 (quoting Second Brief for the 
United States, at *19). 
 231  Id. at 2571. 
 232  Id. at 2574–75 (quoting Second Brief for the United States, at *16). 
 233  Id. at 2582. 
 234  Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2710 
(2009)). 
 235  See id. at 2582–83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing the majority opinion at 
2581). 
The Court today invokes the doctrine of impossibility pre-emption to 
hold that federal law immunizes generic-drug manufacturers from all 
state-law failure-to-warn claims because they cannot unilaterally change 
their labels.  I cannot agree.  We have traditionally held defendants 
claiming impossibility to a demanding standard: Until today, the mere 
possibility of impossibility had not been enough to establish pre-
emption. . . .  The Court strains to reach the opposite conclusion. It 
invents new principles of pre-emption law out of thin air to justify its 
dilution of the impossibility standard.  It effectively rewrites our 
decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which holds that 
federal law does not pre-empt failure-to-warn claims against brand-
name drug manufacturers.  And a plurality of the Court tosses aside 
our repeated admonition that courts should hesitate to conclude that 
Congress intended to pre-empt state laws governing health and safety.  
As a result of today’s decision, whether a consumer harmed by 
inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance 
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holding, the Justices asserted a more outcome-based interpretation of 
preemption—advancing that Congress could never have intended 
the results likely to come about through the majority’s holding.236  
The most offensive aspect of the majority holding was its antithetical 
impact on “the core principle of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
that generic and brand-name drugs are the ‘same’ in nearly all 
respects.”237 
There are an abundance of potential criticisms pertinent to the 
application of preemption in Mensing.  It is not challenging for even 
passive observers to predict that the outcome will fail to adequately 
and equally protect injured patients, will partially subvert the 
Congressional intent of FDA regulations, will impermissibly relax the 
safety standards of manufacturers of inherently dangerous products, 
and will exponentially increase the responsibilities of an 
overburdened federal agency.  Extensive analysis of the Court’s 
missteps is rendered futile in light of the denial of a rehearing; the 
legislature must intervene to avert imminent inequitable results.238 
 
of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or 
generic drug.  The Court gets one thing right: This outcome “makes 
little sense.” 
Id. 
 236  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2591. 
 237  Id. at 2593.  The Justices perceived that obliterating the perception of 
sameness through dissimilar  
liability rules threaten[s] to reduce consumer demand for generics, at 
least among consumers who can afford brand-name drugs.  They may 
pose “an ethical dilemma” for prescribing physicians. . . .  And they 
may well cause the States to rethink their longstanding efforts to 
promote generic use through generic substitution laws. . . .  These 
consequences are directly at odds with the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments’ goal of increasing consumption of generic drugs.   
Id. (citations omitted). 
 238  Cases in the wake of Mensing have involved legally creative approaches to 
obtain patient relief, but success in such approaches is elusive.  See, e.g., In re 
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 08–008, 2011 WL 
5903623, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (In a multidistrict litigation proceeding, the 
appointed court found preemption-by-impossibility for generic manufacturers in 
claims including breach of express warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, failure to 
conform to representation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of consumer 
protection statutes.  Rather than discussing each element, the judge referred to the 
nature of each claim and held that they were functionally preempted for the same 
reason as a failure-to-warn claim would be.  The court further held that a claim for 
breach of implied warranty was preempted because “duty of sameness” between 
brand name and generic manufacturers transfers to design by way of the ANDA 
bioequivalence requirement.); Metz v. Wyeth LLC, 830 F.Supp.2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 
2011) (declining to reconsider the state’s refusal to find liability for brand-name 
manufacturers where a patient was injured by the generic on the theory that the 
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The costs of healthcare are troubling for the nation as a whole 
and for individual patients, yet, the pursuit of cost-savings must 
achieve a balance with the protection of public health.  Policies 
aimed at decreasing expenses that pertain to prescription drug use by 
expanding generic drug utilization have been vastly successful in that 
sector—continuing to suppress expenditures is critical to fiscal 
sustainability.  Although elimination of tort liability would directly 
reduce the operating costs of generic drug manufacturers, the 
temptation must come second to the FDA’s central mission of 
protecting the public health and responsibly fostering innovation.  
Offices within the FDA itself have admitted that they continuously fall 
short with respect to independent monitoring and regulation of the 
prescription drug market,239—as the sole overseer of ANDA-approved 
drug labels, the FDA’s overwhelmed state is only likely to continue 
based on the growth-oriented forecasts of generic drug use and 
approval.  Investigations spanning decades reveal egregious failures 
that unquestionably overlooked direct harm to patients.  Ominously, 
these failures took place in a time when generic manufacturers were 
still motivated to some extent by the potential costs of state tort 
claims, given the explicit preemption of that liability the FDA’s 
competency in oversight is of the utmost importance. 
Since the genesis of legal liability in healthcare, tort law has 
played a crucial role in maintaining safe practices amongst 
participants in the market.  Despite the vast expansion of federal 
regulation, tort law continues to be recognized as protecting the 
health and welfare of patients.  As recently as 2009, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has articulated the distinctive benefits of product liability laws 
in exposing unknown drug hazards, inducing prompt and thorough 
information-sharing by manufacturers, and compensating victims for 
their injuries.240 
Given the interdependent nature of federal and state liability 
laws in the context of healthcare, federal preemption of tort law has 
extensive potential to impact injured persons because the FDA does 
not provide remedy for private injuries.  Ultimately, the Court’s 
unambiguous interpretation of the federal regulations in Mensing 
finding preemption for generic manufacturers cannot be overcome 
 
brand-name owed a duty to the patient to update its own label so that the generic 
manufacturer could do the same). 
 239  See supra Part IV.A. 
 240  See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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by subsequent interpretations, no matter how reasonable the 
argument.  Instead, the extensive array of factors that the dissenting 
justices and the various amicus curiae asserted against finding 
preemption must now be used to support adaptation of federal 
regulation in a way that will render preemption of state tort liability 
for generic drug manufacturers a nullity. 
To achieve the dual objectives of affordability and availability of 
generics on one hand, and their safety on the other, the FDA must 
find an acceptable middle ground.  An example of such compromise 
by the FDA between the competing priorities of generic drug policies 
is evident in the expansion of charging user fees to generic 
manufacturers to help fund FDA oversight.  The increased cost to 
generic manufacturers will be passed on to the consumer, but the 
increased funding will aid the FDA in oversight of safety; a similar 
compromise would serve the FDA well with respect to safety and cost 
and label liability. 
This Comment recommends adaptation of the federal 
regulations pertaining to supplementation of approved drugs in a 
manner mirroring the post-approval reporting requirements for 
ANDA-approved drugs.  The extensive mandates of 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 
lay out the recording and reporting burdens of NDA holders with 
respect to post-approval adverse events.  The equivalent regulation 
for ANDA holders is 21 C.F.R. § 314.98.  Rather than laying out 
independent requirements, this regulation indiscriminately adopts 
the directives of § 314.80, requiring the same adverse event record-
keeping and reporting as that of brand-name drug manufacturers.  
This approach is evidence of recognition that manufacturers of 
generic drugs are in at least an equivalent position to that of brand-
name drug manufacturers to collect post-market safety information 
and report it.  Given generics’ dominant share of a market following 
entry, it is more likely that they are in a superior position to collect 
and report date than their brand-name competitor.  Generics 
account for the vast majority of prescription drug consumption and 
approximately a third of marketed generics have no brand-name 
counterpart on the market at all;241 naturally, absence of public usage 
eliminates reporting requirements entirely, leaving all data collection 
to the generic manufacturer. 
The CBE method embodied in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) is 
derivative of the FDA’s prioritization of public safety.  Endowing 
 
 241  See supra note 71. 
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independent power to brand-name drug manufacturers to modify 
their labels in a manner that will sufficiently notify consumers of 
moderate changes to label warnings is a vehicle of efficiency that errs 
on the side of disclosure and relinquishes agency control.  The 
language used throughout the regulation to describe warnings that 
should be updated is rather similar to standards promulgated by most 
state tort failure-to-warn statutes; both contemplate adequate and fair 
notice to consumers of safe use and the risks they run in utilizing the 
enclosed product.  In 21 C.F.R. § 314.97, the language directs ANDA 
holders to § 314.70 for matters necessitating post-market label 
supplementation.  The operation of § 314.97 for generic label 
changes is, at first glance, equivalent to the adoption of brand-name 
standards in adverse event reporting for generic drugs.  The effects 
are not interpreted the same though; 21 C.F.R. §314.150 creates a 
duty of “sameness” with regard to the label of a generic drug and the 
reference listed drug—this duty trumps the generic manufacturer’s 
ability to make unilateral label changes under § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).242  
In order to influence § 314.97 in a manner that will allow a drug 
approved pursuant to an ANDA, § 314.150 should be reformed. 
Rather than a per se rule that a generic drug must perpetually 
duplicate the reference listed drug upon which it initially relied for 
approval, a rule more mutually applicable should be promulgated.  
Following a pre-determined period, both drugs should be obligated 
to mimic the label of the other so long as divergent changes do not 
come to light.  The trigger for generic manufacturer independence 
should be the greater of either a specific lapse of time or a quantified 
level of market share following its launch.  These measures should 
determine the position a generic manufacturer would need to reach 
to be capable of collecting sufficient event reports.  If the generic 
manufacturer never reaches the trigger point that has been 
established, it should continue to be guided by § 314.150.  While the 
concern has been raised that varying labels will decrease the 
perception of “sameness,” this issue is not implicated by the proposed 
solution.  The current regulation allows for a time gap between a 
brand-name manufacturer’s label change and a generic’s243—allowing 
a reversal in this order would have no functional impact on consumer 
perception or use.   
The fundamental underlying rationale for the labeling 
requirement of § 314.150 in its current form is the approval process 
 
 242  See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 243  See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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of generic drugs, not the subsequent market use of those drugs.244  
Eventually the generic drug’s initial reliance on the reference list 
drug’s safety and efficacy is devoid of utility beyond the cost savings it 
provided for approval by eradicating the need for clinical trials.  
Although extensive, costly, and time-consuming, clinical trials 
conducted for the purposes of a NDA have limited value in terms of 
long-term safety and realistic patient populations.  A novel drug, by 
definition, is new to the market, thus long-term studies do not exist in 
the absence of long-term use.  Patient populations in new drug 
studies are limited by strict study parameters, therefore patient-types 
that will be treated in the real world may not have been significantly 
represented in the trials, furthermore serious but rarer adverse events 
often go undiscovered initially.  Based upon these weaknesses and the 
costs of extending or initiating formal studies beyond what is 
required for approval, long-term safety data is determined extensively 
through tracking and analysis of the post-market reports compiled by 
brand and generic manufacturers alike.  Upon potential discovery of 
a previously unknown adverse drug effect, statistical analysis or 
studies may be required to discern causation.245  As a tenet of the 
compromise suggested between maintaining safety and reducing 
costs, it may be reasonable to require that these studies be conducted 
by the generic company if they are a market leader, this can be a 
determination made by the FDA on a case-by-case basis founded on 
predetermined factors such as market share and so on. 
 In the absence of reforming FDA regulation of generic drug 
label practices, the goals of Congress are at risk of subversion.  One of 
the FDA’s central purposes is to ensure safety of the drugs it oversees; 
because Congress created the FDA, this should be considered an aim 
of Congress as well.  Consequently, the focus on safety must coexist 
with the aim of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments toward driving 
down the costs of prescription drugs and current legislative emphasis 
on driving down the cost of healthcare in general.  When measuring 
healthcare costs in a universal sense, it is impossible to ignore the 
implications of consequences visited upon patients where drug labels 
fail to adequately warn of certain risks.  The cost to patients such as 
Mensing and Demahy are life-long and will be borne by the public 
 
 244  See supra Part II.D. 
 245  See PAUL SELIGMAN, OFF. OF PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & STAT. SCIS., FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., ASSESSING DRUG SAFETY DATA: KEY CONCEPTS & ISSUES 21–27 (2003), 
available at http://ocw.jhsph.edu/courses/drugdevelopment/PDFs/Seligman_Safety 
_Monitoring_Presentation_12_03_03_Rev.pdf. 
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sector through programs such as disability or Medicare. 
Safe use of medicine and cost-effective healthcare go hand-in-
hand; Mensing fails to strike an adequate balance between cost-savings 
and safety.  Tort liability will undoubtedly drive up the cost of doing 
business for generic companies, and they are likely to pass that cost 
along to consumers; however, product liability only requires that 
warnings be reasonable.  It is hard to imagine that patients would 
benefit if generic drug manufacturers were not held to a standard of 
reasonableness. 
Generic drugs can decrease costs for patients only if patients are 
willing to take them.  The present lack of tort liability is likely to 
create a perception in the collective mind of the consuming public 
that generic manufacturers do not have the same emphasis on safety 
that their brand counterparts do.  Even in the absence of this 
concern, consumers may find reason for anxiety in the generic 
manufacturer’s inability to update a label’s warning independently 
where they are compelled to do so.  Additionally, if savvy patients lack 
confidence that they will have avenues for relief when injured by a 
drug, they are far more likely to demand the costlier brand-name 
version of that prescription.246  Alternatively, where patients’ 
prescriptions are substituted at the pharmacy, many are unlikely to be 
aware of the risks they are taking until they find themselves without 
remedy in a court of law. 
The market of authorized generics further erodes the logic of 
the comprehensive federal regulation of drug safety; to allow 
preemption of state tort liability for a brand manufacturer based on 
packaging would certainly distort congressional intent.  Perhaps the 
single most significant consideration in generic drug cost concerns 
will be exacerbated by not negating Mensing.  The very states that have 
been disgorged of private actions for their citizens’ tort claims also 
act as the greatest source of generic prescriptions.247  The substitution 
laws of each state are likely to be approached more critically if the 
states come to consider the dangers of generic consumption as 
outweighing its benefits.  The duty of “sameness” should be limited 
wherever it is promulgated in the regulations applicable to all post-
market activities. 
 
 246  See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 247  See supra note 111. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
While cost savings and reducing barriers in equal access to care 
are lofty healthcare goals, they should not eviscerate the standard of 
safety incumbent upon manufacturers of products that are dangerous 
by their very nature.  If a generic drug label does harm by failing to 
adequately warn physicians or patients about the risks they are taking, 
it does not atone for this by merely being affordable.  There is a level 
of trust given to the medical community that must be protected in 
order to forward the goals of healthcare; this trust cannot be 
maintained if the legislature prevents states from holding producers 
of medicine accountable for their failures. 
In the frenetic and divided political environment of healthcare 
and the role of government within it, there is major reform 
underway.  The reform maintains and expands long-term 
appreciation for the merits of generic drug utilization.  Cost savings 
and equality in delivery are especially emphasized goals in the 
transformation of healthcare, and generics have consistently proven 
that they deliver in these areas.  This Comment does not propose that 
the ANDA process be disproportionately limited, or that generics 
should do independent safety or efficacy studies in coming to market.  
Increasing the cost of bringing a generic drug to market can and 
should be avoided in addressing the risks created by the holding in 
Mensing; however, the law should not go so far as to inhibit consumer 
safety.  Present legislation should be reformed to allow generic 
manufacturers to alter their warnings post-approval through the same 
methods currently available to brand manufacturers.  This simple 
reform would in turn negate the preemption-by-impossibility found 
in Mensing and maintain a critical balance between controlling 
healthcare costs and preserving safety.  Cost savings in the market will 
not be achieved by incentivizing patients to demand more expensive 
products, or by reducing the motivation in the market for drug 
manufacturers to produce and maintain effective warning labels.   
Generic drugs account for the vast majority of prescriptions 
consumed.  If they lead to greater harm than a brand-manufacturer’s 
product does, it is very likely to drive up the cost of care in this 
country, and this result is the exact opposite of the Congressional 
goals behind the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  By affording generic 
drug manufacturers the ability to increase safety warnings through 
the same mechanisms as their brand-name counterparts, the 
legislature will prevent the harmful results that will inevitably follow 
the holding in Mensing. 
